






























The Features of the Spam Emails from the Viewpoint of MTA
YAMAMOTO Hiroshi
Faculty of Education, Art and Science
（平成21年９月30日受理）
Abstract
　In an atempt to investigate the features of spam emails from the viewpoint of MTA, experiments were 
made in 2009 with five real servers instaled in Japan and a domain name under .jp. It has been found that 
not only did a group of spam emails arive at the server with a high MX priority in the DNS, but also 
another did at the one with a low MX priority in comparable numbers and the remaining mails at the other 
with A record in one fewer number of digits. 99.99% of these spam emails came via IPv4 whereas only 
0.01% via IPv6. The countries of origin where their IP addresses were assigned to most were Brazil, Korea, 
Vietnam, China and India in descending order. These five countries made up 42 % of al. 19% of envelope 
from domains in the spam emails were identified as the destination domain. 51% of them had their existent 
domains, but were not reachable email addresses. Reachable addresses were 27% of al. Although SPF and 
Sender ID were registered in 31% and 35% of domains respectively, DomainKeys and DKIM were less than 
0.05%. In one of the experiments in which greet pause was set, about 50% connections were disconnected 
within 10 seconds. After that, the frequency of accumulated disconnections increased in a stair-step fashion 
until almost al were eventualy disconnected within 120 seconds.
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೔㆐ᢙ ✚ಽ㊂ ᐔဋಽ㊂ ㅢߩᦨᄢಽ㊂ ㅢߩᦨዊಽ㊂1 1
ࠨ࡯ࡃฬ
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]ㅢ ࡃࠗ࠻ ࡃࠗ࠻㧛ㅢ ࡃࠗ࠻ ࡃࠗ࠻
㧙 㧙 㧙NS1 0 0
㧙 㧙 㧙NS2 0 0
A 2,295 5,803,399 2,528.71 23,090 833
MX10 18,464 118,365,068 6,410.59 579,535 389
MX20 17,817 79,672,785 4,471.73 59,108 392
38,576 203,841,252 5,284.15 579,535 389ో૕



























































































Table 2　Connection origins (Experiment 1) Table 3　Client names by means of HELO or 
EHLO (Experiment 1)
ࠢ࡜ࠗࠕࡦ࠻ฬ ࠨ࡯ࡃ ࠨ࡯ࡃ ࠨ࡯ࡃ ో૕HELO/EHLO MX10 MX20 A
FQDN ( ) 6,612 (35.8%) 7,480 (42.0%) 254 (11.1%) 14,346 (37.2%)ࠢ࡜ࠗࠕࡦ࠻ ㅒᒁ
IP 2,099 (11.4%) 825 (4.6%) 1,862 (81.1%) 4,786 (12.4%)ࠢ࡜ࠗࠕࡦ࠻ ࠕ࠼࡟ࠬ
from 158 (0.9%) 5 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 163 (0.4%)ࠛࡦࡌࡠ࡯ࡊ ࠼ࡔࠗࡦ
From 58 (0.3%) 5 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 63 (0.2%)ࡋ࠶࠳ 㧦࠼ࡔࠗࡦ
. 4,883 (26.4%) 5,604 (31.5%) 29 (1.3%) 10,516 (27.3%)ޟ 㧔࠼࠶࠻㧕ߥߒޠ
localhost 332 (1.8%) 444 (2.5%) 11 (0.5%) 787 (2.0%)߁ߜ ޟ ޠޔ
FQDN 0 (0.0%) 1 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (0.0%)ࠨ࡯ࡃ
IP 795 (4.3%) 775 (4.3%) 0 (0.0%) 1,570 (4.1%)ࠨ࡯ࡃ ࠕ࠼࡟ࠬ




































































ࠛࡦࡌࡠ࡯ࡊ ࠨ࡯ࡃ ࠨ࡯ࡃ ࠨ࡯ࡃ ో૕from MX10 MX20 A
17,476 (100.0%) 15,136 (100.0%) 26 (100.0%) 32,638 (100.0%)✚ᢙ
3,866 (22.1%) 2,388 (15.7%) 2 (7.7%) 6,256 (19.2%)ተవߣหߓ࠼ࡔࠗࡦ
695 (4.0%) 233 (1.5%) 2 (7.7%) 930 (2.8%)࠼ࡔࠗࡦਇሽ࿷
࠼ࡔࠗࡦߪሽ࿷ߔࠆ߇
7,437 (42.6%) 9,201 (60.8%) 22 (84.6%) 16,660 (51.0%)ࡔ࡯࡞ߪዯ߆ߥ޿
㧔 ╬㧕user unknown
5,478 (31.3%) 3,314 (21.9%) 0 (0.0%) 8,792 (26.9%)ࡔ࡯࡞߇ዯߊ
From: 15,739 (90.1%) 12,536 (82.8%) 22 (84.6%) 28,297 (86.7%)ࡋ࠶࠳ ߣ৻⥌
From: 1,737 (9.9%) 2,600 (17.2%) 4 (15.4%) 4,341 (13.3%)ࡋ࠶࠳ ߣਇ৻⥌
Table 4　Sender mail adrresses (Experiment 3) 　　Table 5　Sender domains (Experiment 3)
[%]㗅૏ ࠼ࡔࠗࡦฬ ㅢᢙ Ყ₸
1 gmail.com 148 0.5
2 yahoo.com 138 0.4
3 hotmail.com 109 0.3
4 yahoo.co.jp 87 0.3
5 yahoo.cn 86 0.3
6 nifty.com 84 0.3
7 msn.com 79 0.2
8 odn.ne.jp 78 0.2
9 excite.co.jp 76 0.2






































































್ቯ⚿ᨐ ޟ ޠࠨ࡯ࡃ ޟ ޠࠨ࡯ࡃ ޟ ޠࠨ࡯ࡃ ో૕SPF MX10 MX20 A
fail 829 (8.1%) 466 (3.4%) 120 (5.2%) 1,415 (5.4%)
softfail 882 (8.7%) 768 (5.7%) 234 (10.2%) 1,884 (7.2%)
neutral 2,035 (20.0%) 1,660 (12.3%) 222 (9.7%) 3,917 (15.1%)
pass 586 (5.7%) 171 (1.3%) 0 (0.0%) 757 (2.9%)
permerror 52 (0.5%) 70 (0.5%) 0 (0.0%) 122 (0.5%)
none 5,811 (57.0%) 10,376 (76.8%) 1,719 (74.9%) 17,906 (68.9%)
10,195 (100.0%) 13,511 (100.0%) 2,295 (100.0%) 26,001 (100.0%)⸘
Table 6　SPF results (Experiment 1) Table 7　Sender ID results (Experiment 1)
ޟ ޠࠨ࡯ࡃ ޟ ޠࠨ࡯ࡃ ޟ ޠࠨ࡯ࡃ ో૕Sender ID MX10 MX20 A
್ቯ⚿ᨐ
fail 545 (5.6%) 641 (5.1%) 121 (5.3%) 1,307 (5.3%)
softfail 1,053 (10.8%) 1,274 (10.2%) 235 (10.3%) 2,562 (10.5%)
neutral 2,040 (21.0%) 1,598 (12.8%) 222 (9.7%) 3,860 (15.8%)
pass 573 (5.9%) 157 (1.3%) 0 (0.0%) 730 (3.0%)
permerror 53 (0.5%) 51 (0.4%) 0 (0.0%) 104 (0.4%)
none 5,473 (56.2%) 8,744 (70.1%) 1,708 (74.7%) 15,925 (65.0%)





















































Table 9　Charset (Experiment 1)
Fig. 1　Greet Pause（Experiment 2）
ޟ ޠࠨ࡯ࡃ ޟ ޠࠨ࡯ࡃ ޟ ޠࠨ࡯ࡃ ో૕Content-type MX10 MX20 A
text/plain 1,206 (6.7%) 1,028 (5.9%) 131 (5.7%) 2,365 (6.3%)
text/html 10,620 (58.8%) 6,165 (35.3%) 0 (0.0%) 16,785 (44.4%)
multipart 6,248 (34.8%) 10,253 (58.8%) 2,154 (94.3%) 18,655 (49.3%)
18,074 (100.0%) 17,446 (100.0%) 2,285 (100.0%) 37,805 (100.0%)⸘
Table 8　Content-type (Experiment 1)
ޟ ޠࠨ࡯ࡃ ޟ ޠࠨ࡯ࡃ ޟ ޠࠨ࡯ࡃ ో૕charset MX10 MX20 A
ISO-8859-1 8,816 (41.9%) 10,547 (42.4%) 44 (1.0%) 19,407 (38.6%)
ISO-8859-2 380 (1.8%) 287 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 667 (1.3%)
ISO-8859-3 21 (0.1%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 21 (0.0%)
ISO-8859-4 36 (0.2%) 1 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 37 (0.1%)
ISO-8859-5 34 (0.2%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 34 (0.1%)
ISO-8859-6 28 (0.1%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 28 (0.1%)
ISO-8859-7 35 (0.2%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 35 (0.1%)
ISO-8859-8 29 (0.1%) 1 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 30 (0.1%)
ISO-8859-9 39 (0.2%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 39 (0.1%)
ISO-8859-10 26 (0.1%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 26 (0.1%)
ISO-8859-11 35 (0.2%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 35 (0.1%)
ISO-8859-13 27 (0.1%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 27 (0.1%)
ISO-8859-14 19 (0.1%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 19 (0.0%)
ISO-8859-15 31 (0.1%) 0 (0.0%) 12 (0.3%) 43 (0.1%)
ISO-2022-JP 124 (0.6%) 83 (0.3%) 0 (0.0%) 207 (0.4%)
UTF-8 3,263 (15.5%) 2,845 (11.4%) 0 (0.0%) 6,108 (12.2%)
us-ascii 3,945 (18.7%) 1,803 (7.3%) 2 (0.0%) 5,750 (11.4%)
SJIS 34 (0.2%) 20 (0.1%) 0 (0.0%) 54 (0.1%)
Windows-1250 653 (3.1%) 266 (1.1%) 2,144 (49.3%) 3,063 (6.0%)
Windows-1251 259 (1.2%) 106 (0.4%) 6 (0.1%) 371 (0.7%)
Windows-1252 2,476 (11.8%) 8,118 (32.7%) 2,133 (49.1%) 12,727 (25.3%)
koi8-r 718 (3.4%) 774 (3.1%) 5 (0.1%) 1,497 (3.0%)
koi8-u 1 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (0.0%)
GB2312 0 (0.0%) 1 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (0.0%)
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　Fuly Qualified Domain Nameの略．一切省略
しない完全なドメイン名のこと．末尾にも「.」を
付けると上位側が略されていないことを明示でき
る．
HELO
　SMTPコマンド．SMTP接続後，最初にクライ
アントがHELOコマンドで自己のFQDNを名乗る
ことになっていた．しかし今ではHELOの代わり
にEHLOを優先して使用することが定められ，
HELOはあまり使われなくなった．
MTA
　Mail Transfer Agentの略．電子メールの配送を
行うデーモン．電子メール利用者が直接触れるも
のではないが，MTAが作動していないと電子メー
ルの配送は行われない．
MUA
　Mail User Agentの略．利用者が電子メール読み
書きのために直接操作するプログラム．
MX
　DNSに登録するレコードの種別で，Mail 
Exchangerの略．電子メールの宛先ドメイン名を
IPアドレスに変換する際に使用される．
RIR
　Regional Internet Registryの略．世界を５つの
地域に分け，それぞれの地域内へIPアドレスを割
り当て管理する５つの組織．
SPF
　Sender Policy Frameworkの略．発信元IPアド
レスによって送信者メールアドレスが真正かどう
かを検証する規格．
TLS
　Transport Layer Securityの略．暗号化・認証・
改竄検出の機能を有する通信規格で，通常はTCP
上で使用される．以前はSSL（Secure Sockets 
Layer）と呼ばれていた．
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